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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an adversary model to facilitate forensic investigations of mobile
devices (e.g. Android, iOS andWindows smartphones) that can be readily adapted to the
latest mobile device technologies. This is essential given the ongoing and rapidly changing
nature of mobile device technologies. An integral principle and significant constraint upon
forensic practitioners is that of forensic soundness. Our adversary model specifically con-
siders and integrates the constraints of forensic soundness on the adversary, in our case, a
forensic practitioner. One construction of the adversary model is an evidence collection and
analysis methodology for Android devices. Using the methodology with six popular cloud
apps, we were successful in extracting various information of forensic interest in both the
external and internal storage of the mobile device.
Introduction
Human beings have become increasingly dependent on information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs) not just for work and commercial functions, but also for many daily activities.
The advent of Web 2.0, since around the mid-2000s, marked the introduction of pervasive
interconnectivity, otherwise known as an ‘always-on’ lifestyle. This has made ICT (e.g. mobile
devices and apps) paramount to everyday life, such that any significant technical glitch or out-
age in internet access or mobile transmission would lead to mass frustration, confusion, and
even panic.
Holt and Bossler [1] explained that “[a]s technology increasingly permeates all facets of
modern life, there are substantive risks to the safety of digital information and computer net-
works”. For example, the increasing popularity of mobile devices including smart phones (e.g.
iOS and Android devices) constitutes an opportunity for cybercriminals.
Technological advances should not, however, be blamed for any increase in criminal exploi-
tation of ICT. Cyber threats and windows of vulnerability evolve over time, partly in response
to defensive actions or crime displacement. Therefore, we need to maintain persistent pressure
on cybercriminals to safeguard the security and privacy of our data (e.g. stored on mobile
devices) even though we may never be able to completely eradicate cybercrime.
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To increase the risks of detection and successful prosecution due to the ability to collect evi-
dence from mobile devices, it is important to stay ahead of the race between device (i.e. hard-
ware) and software releases by providers, and software and hardware modifications made by
end users to complicate or prevent the collection and analysis of digital evidence.
During investigations of crimes involving mobile devices, there is usually some accumula-
tion or retention of data on the device that will need to be identified, preserved, analyzed and
presented in a court of law—a process known as digital or mobile forensics (also known as
cyber forensics) [2].
Potential evidential data that could be recovered from mobile devices includes login creden-
tials for cloud storage and other online accounts, and metadata such as when and where a
photo or video was taken (i.e. geolocation) using the mobile device or stored in the cloud.
Studies of digital forensic toolkits currently available to law enforcement agencies reveal sig-
nificant challenges and complications in extracting evidence from newer devices, with attempts
to extract information from various mobile devices using a range of mobile forensic tools pro-
ducing differing results [3, 4].
There is little doubt that governments will continue to be under pressure to deliver more
with less. This will apply to the provision of law enforcement services no less than other gov-
ernment services. Therefore, to keep pace with this growth and the changing face of criminal
activity, particularly to ensure that evidential data can be forensically recovered from mobile
devices, we propose a forensic adversary model for mobile device data collection and analysis.
Forensic practitioners, like adversaries, are subject to certain constraints. In the case of a foren-
sic practitioner, these constraints relate to “forensic soundness”. These constraints help to
ensure that evidence remains valid and suitable for presentation to a court of law and that it
remains untainted. We integrate the constraints of forensic soundness into our adversary
model, resulting in a forensically sound adversary model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related work.
Section 3 outlines our research motivations. We then present our mobile forensic adversary
model and a construction of this model, the Android evidence collection and analysis method-
ology (see also [5]), in Section 4. We discuss the utility of our construction in Section 5. The
last section concludes this paper and outlines future work.
RelatedWork
2.1 Adversary Models
Adversary models have long been an important part of designing and validating cryptographic
and secure systems (e.g. used to prove or disprove the properties of a cryptographic protocol).
An adversary generally has capabilities, such as the ability to listen to all messages transmitted
by a target. One of the most recognized and utilized adversary models is, perhaps, the Dolev-Yao
model [6]. An adversary in this particular model has capabilities that verge on omnipotence,
including the ability to intercept messages from a target, modify these messages and even initiate
a connection with the target. Similarly, Bellare and Rogaway’s adversary model [7] provided the
adversary with comparable capabilities. The adversary has the capacity to control all communi-
cations between the interacting parties. All messages produced by the parties are observable and
modifiable by the adversary. The adversary is even capable of controlling the delays between
messages, replaying messages, employing multiple sessions and corrupting an honest user in the
system. Some may criticize that both adversary models are too strong, and hence, unrealistic.
Adversary models have also been used in network security to replicate and simulate attacks
on communications protocols. Syverson, et al. [8] presented an adversary model for networks
utilizing onion routing. The capabilities of this model include the ability to: observe (sniff) a
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connection, delay or corrupt a connection, initiate or destroy a connection and modify a con-
nection’s traffic at will. This model differs somewhat from those designed for cryptographic
protocols. The adversary’s main aim is to compromise connections between parties instead of
manipulating the data of the actual traffic itself. Similarly to the cryptographic-based adversary
models, this model is somewhat specific to the field of network security.
In the field of privacy preservation, adversary models have been used to model privacy inva-
sions. Heiber and Marron [9] considered the privacy of users in context-aware systems and
presented a framework for the modelling of privacy within these systems. In order to demon-
strate their model, the authors utilized an adversary model capable of over-hearing all wireless
transmissions in a network and also having full access to the context-aware system’s location
service. The specificity of this model makes it difficult to use outside of this research.
Within the field of Android security, a number of researchers have also utilized adversary
models within their work. For example, both Wu, et al. [10] and Zhou, et al. [11] utilize adver-
sary models that involve the adversary simulating a malicious third-party app installed on an
Android device. The adversary model of Zhou, et al. [11] can only request non-sensitive per-
missions and the adversary model of is unable to request for any permissions. Such specific
adversary models cannot be used to generalize or model other types of security attackers.
Other research that makes use of adversaries often informally defines an adversary or an
adversary’s capabilities, or refers to the adversary in passing. The use of loosely defined adver-
saries (e.g. a “strong adversary”) and/or adversary capabilities means that the research lacks a
concrete adversary which would be useful in other research environments. Bugiel, Heuser and
Sadeghi [12] presented a security architecture for access control on Android devices. In doing
so, the authors provided an adversary model that exhibited a “strong” adversary able to “access
sensitive data” and “launch software attacks”. Although their research does not focus on the
adversary model, the formalization concerning the capabilities of their proposed adversary
model is somewhat lacking.
As described above and shown in Table 1, there are many different use cases for adversary
models (with varying levels of competence). These different use cases also prompt research-
ers to design their own adversary models that may be incompatible with other research both
inside and outside of their field of study. For example, Syverson, et al. [8] focused on the
security of onion routing networks which are designed to provide anonymity. Cryptographic
protocols, on the other hand, are intended to provide secure communications between par-
ties—the identity of each party would be known before communication had even com-
menced. Further differences arise when comparing a cryptographic or networking adversary
to a smartphone adversary. Take, for example, a user with a smartphone which is connected
to an onion routing network who wishes to perform a secure transaction with another party.
A smartphone adversary typically wishes to obtain sensitive user data (e.g. contact phone
numbers, location information and login details), message or call premium numbers or oth-
erwise obtain some data of (monetary) value whilst the onion routing adversary seeks to
determine the identity of the user. The cryptographic adversary would like to decrypt the
secure communications between the smartphone and the other party. Table 1 demonstrates
the differences in adversary models with regards to the ways they are defined, including their
goals and assumptions (and the levels of detail provided).
2.2 Android Data Collection
There have been a number of data collection methodologies designed specifically for Android
devices. These are a combination of techniques (methods or approaches), often with an under-
lying process (model or framework) in order to bring them together.
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Most notable of the current methodologies proposed is the general collection methodology
for Android devices presented by Vidas, Zhang and Christin [13]. It comprises a process for
obtaining data from an Android device that relies on a bootable image which is flashed onto
the Android device. The images differ based on the phone model and are required to be flashed
over the original recovery image on the Android device. This custom recovery mode is able to
extract all data from the NAND and any attached SD cards of the device without requiring
root access. One major problem with this approach is that newer phones (released after the
publication of [13] in 2011) have locked bootloaders, generally requiring the device be wiped in
order to unlock them (if indeed there are ways to unlock the bootloader at all).
Lessard and Kessler [14] presented a process for obtaining all the data from an Android
NAND (Negated AND) flash. One technique proposed allowed for collecting a bit-for-bit copy
of the NAND flash itself in order to perform data recovery on deleted items. Their process
requires rooting the device in order to perform a “dd” image of the relevant partitions and stor-
ing these on an external SD card attached to the device, and then analyzing these dumps for
potential evidence. One issue with this technique is that it requires rooting the device and the
disadvantages to the forensic process that it brings in order to create these images and the tech-
nique also requires the device to have a microSD card slot. Many popular Android devices,
such as the Nexus 5, Samsung Galaxy S6 and LG G2, do not have the ability to accept SD cards,
rendering this process infeasible on these devices.
Chen, Yang and Liu [15] suggested that physical data acquisition on an Android device can
be performed without modifying the Android device in almost any manner and presented a
Table 1. A comparison of adversary models.
Adversary
Capabilities
Fully Defined?
Adversary Goals Adversary Assumptions Adversary Model Limitations
Dolev and Yao [6]
(Cryptographic
protocols)
Yes The adversary seeks to obtain the
plaintext for encrypted messages
on the network.
The adversary can read any
message on the network, and
can initiate a two-way
connection with any other user.
Very powerful, making it difficult to
model weaker adversaries.
Bellare and Rogaway
[7] (Cryptographic
protocols)
Yes Similarly to the Dolev-Yao model,
the adversary aims to obtain the
long-term secret key and/or the
ephemeral / session key.
The adversary has similar
capabilities to the Dolev-Yao
model, including the ability to
delay or replay messages.
Very powerful, but also flexible due
to the notion of “queries” (i.e.
adversary capabilities).
Syverson, et al. [8]
(Network security)
No The aim of the adversary is to
determine the identity of (i.e. de-
anonymize) the traffic flowing
through its compromised nodes.
The adversary is assumed to
have control of one or more
nodes (known as Core Onion
Routers).
Adversary capabilities are not
formally defined. Furthermore, this
model is specific to onion routing
(e.g. compromised nodes), and
cannot be generalizable.
Heiber and Marron
[9] (Network security)
Yes The adversary’s goal is to collect
personal or private data (e.g.
location information) from a
network.
The adversary is designed such
that it is only able to view data
(i.e. it cannot modify it).
A weak adversary that is formally
defined using inference rules.
Wu, et al. [10]
(Android security)
No The adversary aims to steal
money from the user, gather
sensitive information or destroy
data on the device.
The adversary cannot initially
request any “sensitive”
permissions.
The adversary is defined very
loosely. This means it cannot be
used for formal proofs.
Zhou, et al. [11]
(Android security)
No The adversary aims to accurately
determine the locations and
behaviors of the user.
The adversary cannot request
any permissions initially.
This adversary is also very loosely
defined.
Bugiel, Heuser and
Sadeghi [12] (Android
security)
No The adversary’s goals are to
obtain sensitive data and
compromise apps on the device
(both system and third-party)
The adversary is assumed to be
“strong”.
This adversary lacks meaningful
detail.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138449.t001
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process to do so. The authors use the Android device’s recovery mode in order to run their own
“update.zip” (generally used by carriers and phone manufacturers to issue Android OS updates)
package which is stored on an external SD card. As the “update.zip” package runs as a root pro-
cess, it is able to perform a physical data acquisition of the Android device and dump it onto the
SD card. Two major problems arise with this suggested method. Firstly and most importantly,
this method relies on the Android device having already have flashed a third-party recovery
mode on the recovery partition. This is unlikely to be the case as the user would have to unlock
the bootloader of the device and flash this software manually. The reason a third-party recovery
mode software is required is that first-party recovery modes generally have signature checking
which is used to make sure the “update.zip” files were packaged by the appropriate authority
(carriers or phone manufacturers). Such an “update.zip” package designed by the authors would
refuse to run on first-party recovery modes. In addition to requiring a third-party recovery
mode, this method also requires the device have an SD card slot.
A methodology for collecting data from Android devices was presented by Votipka, Vidas
and Christin [16]. They suggested that a custom recovery image could be built which can be eas-
ily ported to many Android devices. This image contains forensic tools that can extract all the
required data in a forensically sound manner from the Android device. In order to bypass a
locked bootloader, the authors rely on the forensic practitioner having the ability to obtain the
manufacturer key used to sign legitimate bootloader images. In most cases, device manufactur-
ers are unlikely to be in the same jurisdiction as the forensic practitioner and may not be legally
obligated to provide the key. This makes it highly infeasible that a forensic practitioner would be
able to obtain the key. Furthermore, flashing this custom recovery image overwrites the original
first-party recovery mode on the device, reducing the forensic soundness of this process.
Similarly, Son, et al. [17] proposed a data acquisition process for Android that relied on the
use of a custom recovery mode image that was flashed onto the boot partition. Flashing the
boot partition with a custom recovery mode image will render the device unable to boot into
the original Android OS. The authors state that the boot image must be flashed with the origi-
nal boot image of the device, which may be difficult (and not forensically sound depending on
the source) to obtain. They also designed an application that extracts user data stored within
the Android device via ADB after the custom recovery mode image was installed. Although
their process should be capable of collecting most of the data from the Android device’s
NAND flash, the authors focus on obtaining user and app data.
Finally, a crucial stage that the majority of contemporary data collection methodologies cur-
rently lack is the analysis of the collected data. Without accurate analysis, the collected data
cannot be utilized to its full extent. In addition, without an adequate analysis of the collected
evidence, the forensic practitioner may omit critical evidential data.
Research Motivations
As discussed in the previous section, adversary models exist for a range of fields in the security
and cryptography disciplines. However, adversary models have not yet been adopted in digital
forensics. We hope to contribute to filling this gap in this paper as we believe that the role of
the traditional security ‘adversary’ represented in existing models and a forensic practitioner
conducting investigations have significant parallels.
Generally, adversary models are designed for use in a particular field, each of which has dif-
ferent specific requirements and capabilities. This holds true for digital forensic adversary mod-
els, where an overriding principle must be maintained, that is, the principle of ensuring that
evidence sources remain unmodified wherever possible [2]. Where a change to an evidence
source is required to collect evidence, these changes must be discrete (i.e. the practitioner must
A Forensically Sound Adversary Model for Mobile Devices
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be able to report upon the exact actions they performed and the transient and persistent effect
(s) this had on the device, preferably at the bit level for persistent changes) and kept to an abso-
lute minimum [2]. This requirement significantly constrains the ability for forensic practitioners
to utilize a range of invasive attack techniques (particularly attacks developed by unknown indi-
viduals, with only compiled code released) that would be available to traditional adversaries.
For example, when collecting evidence from secure devices, practitioners often need to
bypass operating system (OS) or hardware security features (e.g. app / process sandboxing). In
the case of smartphones, this is achieved via ‘rooting’ or ‘jailbreaking’ the device. These pro-
cesses generally rely upon security flaws to escalate the privileges of the attack code, and in
turn, the device’s user. However, in most cases, the source code underlying the privilege escala-
tion procedure is not released. This makes it particularly difficult for a forensic practitioner to
report on the discrete operations that are being undertaken on the device. In practice, this
could result in the destruction or modification of evidence on the device, either intentionally or
inadvertently, by the privilege escalation procedure.
In contrast, while many adversary models constrain the adversary by requiring that attacks
be executed remotely (e.g. via a network link), such restrictions do not apply to forensic prac-
titioners. In most cases, forensic practitioners are able to ‘seize’ the physical device being ana-
lyzed and, as such, have access to capabilities that require physical access/control of the
device. This is a reasonable and necessary ability for forensic practitioners in most cases, even
in circumstances where the only apparently feasible option is remote collection of evidence
[18]. This is apparent, for example, in the case of cloud computing evidential data, which is
commonly stored on remote servers outside of the jurisdiction of the investigating law
enforcement agency (LEA). However, despite the primary evidence source being remotely
located, evidential data generally exists on the client devices (e.g. laptops, tablets and smart-
phones) that are used to connect to the remote cloud service. These client devices are generally
located within the jurisdiction of the investigating LEA and within the possession or control
of the individual being investigated (drawing a physical link between the electronic evidence
and the suspect [19]).
The contribution of an adversary model in the field of digital forensics allows for a more for-
mal approach to the development of forensic methodologies. The model can be used as a basis
for ensuring that a practitioner can conduct an investigation using only the forensically sound
capabilities available to them (e.g. mapping adversary capabilities in combination with an exist-
ing forensic model to develop a forensically sound methodology).
Mobile Forensic Adversary Model
4.1 The Proposed Model
As described in Section 3, one of the primary constraints on the forensic adversary is in ensur-
ing that all actions on the evidence item are forensically sound. As such, it should be noted that
all of the above capabilities are discrete (i.e. the practitioner is aware of the precise effect they
will have on the device being analyzed) and documented as part of standard forensic reporting
procedures. Based on the definitions of McKemmish [20] and Casey [21], we formalize the def-
inition of forensic soundness in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Forensic Soundness) A process is forensically sound if it satisfies all of the fol-
lowing key criteria described by McKemmish [20] and Casey [21]:
1. Meaning: Meaning refers to the fact that evidence that is collected as part of digital forensic
investigations must retain its original meaning and interpretation. However, it should be
noted that “[i]mposing a paradigm of ‘‘preserve everything but change nothing” is
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impractical and doing so can create undue doubt in the results of a digital evidence analysis,
with questions that have no relation to the merits of the conclusions” [21].
2. Errors: Errors refer to the need to identify the existence of errors, when they occur, and,
explain and justify that their existence has not affected the core validity of the evidence.
Hashes are a common method of detecting errors during forensic collection processes.
3. Transparency and Trustworthiness: Transparency and trustworthiness highlight the need
for independent oversight into the forensic processes used. For example, a court may wish
to validate the integrity of the process.
4. Experience: Experience refers to the need for individuals undertaking forensic investigations
to have sufficient experience, such that their findings can be relied upon.
The forensic soundness criteria (Definition 1) are considered in the selection of available
capabilities, outlined below, and specific constraints raised by these criteria are noted as part of
our capability descriptions.
Following the approaches of Dolev and Yao [6] and Bellare and Rogaway [7], we introduce
an adversary model for mobile forensic data collection and analysis. In this model, there exists
an adversary with physical access to a mobile device and capabilities to exploit device security
vulnerabilities. The adversary aims to obtain confidential data from a target device within the
constraints of forensic soundness (Definition 1). These capabilities are described below:
1. Corrupt (Target device) allows the adversary to take over the Target device. Such a capa-
bility, typically used to capture insider attacks in cryptographic protocols and network secu-
rity, allows the adversary to learn the complete internal state of the device. Under a strict
implementation of the forensic soundness criteria, this capability would be constrained to
functions that do not introduce errors (e.g. modification of evidential data sources) or result
in a loss of transparency and trustworthiness (e.g. the execution of unknown operation
sequences on the Target device).
2. Delete (Target device, Target data) enables the adversary to delete data (Target data)
stored on the Target device. Under a strict implementation of the forensic soundness criteria,
this capability would be significantly constrained to functions that do not result in the intro-
duction of errors or a loss ofmeaning (e.g. deletion operations on evidential data sources).
3. Encrypt/Decrypt (Target device, Target data, Key) allows the adversary to either
encrypt or decrypt a message (Target data) from the Target device with the Key. For the
Decrypt function, the decryption key is obtained using another capability (e.g. Foren-
sic Examination). It may not necessarily be feasible to obtain the decryption key for all
encrypted items (e.g. the keys may be stored remotely). A strict implementation of the
forensic soundness criteria would not significantly affect this capability as it operates on
data that has been collected (e.g. Forensic Copy), rather than evidence source data.
4. Exploit (Target device, Entry-point) allows the adversary to exploit the Target device
using a known exploit. Under a strict implementation of the forensic soundness criteria, this
capability would be constrained to functions that do not introduce errors or result in a loss
of transparency and trustworthiness.
5. Forensic Copy (Target device) allows the adversary to make a logical or physical forensic
copy of the Target device. This capability intrinsically meets the criteria for forensic sound-
ness. The capability would be designed to ensure that errors are avoided and identified
where they are encountered as part of the copy procedure.
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6. Forensic Examination (Target device, Target data,Method) allows the adversary to
undertake a forensic examination of Target data on the Target device using a specific
Method (e.g. keyword searches). The operation of the capability would be subject to the
forensic soundness criteria, particularly themeaning criteria, in ensuring that the true
meaning of any data examined is maintained. This is fundamentally related to the experi-
ence of the forensic practitioner.
7. Inject (Target device, Entry-point,Message) allows the adversary to inject or infiltrate a
Message (i.e. binary data such as code) onto the Target device via an entry-point (e.g. infil-
trated app). For example, an adversary could add code into the Keyboard app (Entry-point)
on the Target device to facilitate other attacks (e.g. Transmit) [22]. Under a strict imple-
mentation of the forensic soundness criteria, this capability would be constrained to func-
tions that do not introduce errors or result in a loss of transparency and trustworthiness or
meaning.
8. Listen (Target device) allows the adversary to passively monitor a communication chan-
nel on the Target device. This capability must be utilized with consideration for the require-
ment to obtain data with a knownmeaning, ensure that errors in collection are avoided and
identified where unavoidable, and that the process for interception is subject to transparent
review.
9. Modify (Target device, Target data,Message) allows the adversary to modify an existing
message (Target data) on a Target device, replacing it with a new message (Message). An
example would be an adversary replacing configuration or modifying app execution on a
device. Under a strict implementation of the forensic soundness criteria, this capability
would be constrained to functions that do not introduce errors or result in a loss of transpar-
ency and trustworthiness ormeaning.
10. Transmit (Target device,Message) permits the adversary to transmit and/or exfiltrate a
Message (i.e. binary data such as code and SMS) from the Target device. As with the Lis-
ten capability, this capability must be utilized with consideration for the requirement to
transmit data with a foreknown effect (i.e.meaning), ensure that errors in transmission are
avoided and identified where unavoidable, and that the process for transmission is subject
to transparent review.
Based on the definition of forensic soundness and the proposed adversary capabilities, we
introduce two levels of forensic soundness: strict and standard. A forensic practitioner requir-
ing a strict level of forensic soundness can only utilize constrained adversary capabilities (with
the constraints outlined above). A strict adherence to forensic soundness should be the initial
stage in any investigation in order to reduce modification of evidence sources. The less strin-
gent standard level of forensic soundness could be utilized if a strict investigation does not pro-
vide sufficient evidence. It is at this level that forensic practitioners should use the capabilities
to their full potential to obtain evidential data, while meeting the constraints of forensic sound-
ness (Definition 1).
4.2 A Construction
The following section provides a brief outline of our Android evidence collection and analysis
methodology [5]–see Fig 1. The methodology is constructed using the mobile forensic adver-
sary model (outlined in Section 4.1).
After identification and preservation of the mobile device has been completed, evidential
data collection must be undertaken. Collection commences with the configuration of the
A Forensically Sound Adversary Model for Mobile Devices
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Fig 1. Android evidence collection and analysis methodology (adapted from [5]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138449.g001
A Forensically Sound Adversary Model for Mobile Devices
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0138449 September 22, 2015 9 / 15
bootloader, which must be setup to allow the booting of a live OS. This recovery image is
booted and then used to collect the physical image(s) of the device partition(s).
Using the images obtained as part of the initial collection stages, we then undertake exami-
nation and analysis procedures of a forensic copy of the data stored on the device. Once a prac-
titioner has determined the apps that they wish to investigate, they begin by examining the files
stored by the app in its private storage, followed by any files stored in the device’s external stor-
age (e.g. SD card). During this examination, it is common to find databases which are exam-
ined as part of the next stage. Finally, if the app being examined has an online component (e.g.
cloud sync), the account data stored on the device is examined and analyzed to obtain any rele-
vant credentials. If the practitioner has any doubts as to themeaning of the data obtained dur-
ing the examination, they will then undertake an analysis of the app which involves examining
the app memory heap in a virtual environment and decompilation of the app code to gain an
understanding of the code’s operation. Once all relevant data has been obtained and its mean-
ing and provenience (i.e. the source of the evidential data) is fully understood, the practitioner
will report and present their findings. The practitioner may also appear as an expert witness in
a court of law.
With regards to forensic soundness, the Android evidence collection and analysis methodol-
ogy should meet the strict level of forensic soundness as defined in Section 4.1, dependent on
the implementation used and the experience of the forensic practitioner. Even though this
methodology requires modifications to be made to the evidence source, all modifications
should be fully known by the practitioner and therefore follow the strict adversary capability
constraints (see Table 2).
The third and fourth columns of this table are especially pertinent as they provide the spe-
cific forensic soundness constraints for a stage and whether the stage adheres to the constraints,
respectively. For example, the modification and exploitation of the evidence source to allow the
bootloader to accept the forensic practitioner’s custom live OS has three constraints: the pro-
cess must not introduce errors, it must be clear (i.e. transparent and trustworthy) what modifi-
cations are being made and it must not affect themeaning of the evidence. Depending on how
the device is modified, errorsmay be introduced (e.g. by flashing boot partitions). Ideally, no
errors should be introduced if the device has been successfully exploited. Transparency and
Table 2. A mapping of methodology stages to adversary capabilities, constraints and adherence to forensic soundness constraints.
Methodology Stage [5] Adversary Capabilities
Utilized
Key Forensic Soundness
Constraints
Adherence to Forensic Soundness Constraints
Setup Bootloader for Live
OS
Exploit and Modify Errors, Transparency and
Trustworthiness, and Meaning
Implementation dependent for Errors, adheres for
Transparency and Trustworthiness, and Meaning
Boot Live OS in Memory Inject Errors, Transparency and
Trustworthiness, and Meaning
Adheres to all applicable forensic soundness constraints
Collect Physical Image of
Device Partitions
Forensic Copy N/A N/A
Examine App Files in
Private Storage
Forensic
Examination
Meaning Experience dependent
Examine App Files on
External Storage
Forensic
Examination
Meaning Experience dependent
Examine App Databases Forensic
Examination
Meaning Experience dependent
Examine and Analyze
Accounts Data
Inject, Modify and
Transmit
Errors, Transparency and
Trustworthiness, and Meaning
Adheres to all applicable forensic soundness constraints
Analyze App Forensic
Examination
Meaning Experience dependent
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138449.t002
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trustworthiness, andmeaning of the evidence are not affected by this stage. Further along the
methodology are the three stages that relate to examining data on the evidence source’s exter-
nal and internal (private) storage. Themeaning of the evidence obtained is directly linked to
the forensic practitioner’s experience in dealing with similar devices and knowledge of what
constitutes evidential data.
Discussion
In order to verify the Mobile Forensic Adversary Model when applied to the Android evidence
collection and analysis methodology [5], we analyzed a Google Nexus 4 mobile device (see sec-
tions 5.1–5.3) and six popular cloud apps, namely, Dropbox, Box, OneDrive, OneNote, Ever-
note and ownCloud [23] (see sections 5.4–5.8). The relationship between our findings and the
adversary’s capabilities and forensic soundness constraints is presented in the following
subsections.
5.1 Setup Bootloader for Live OS
After the identification and preservation stages have been completed, the first step is to
Exploit the security features in the device bootloader with a view to booting an alternative,
forensically sound, operating system on the mobile device. This Exploit generally requires
the modification (i.e. use of the Modify capability) of low level parameters within the device
flash, which are configured by default to prevent the execution of unsigned operating systems.
Constraints on the Modify and Exploit capabilities must be adhered to as part of this pro-
cess, for example, ensuring that errors in the evidence source are not inadvertently introduced
during the modification of the bootloader configuration parameters. The process used must be
subject to transparent and trustworthy verification, which limits the capacity for forensic prac-
titioners to utilize existing exploits where the detailed operation of the exploit is unknown.
5.2 Boot Live OS in Memory
Once the bootloader has been appropriately configured, the Inject capability is used to exe-
cute the OS code for the forensically sound operating system in device memory. Similar foren-
sic soundness constraints apply to this stage as those for setting up the bootloader. For
example, the operating system used must be transparently verifiable, not introduce unavoidable
errors and be designed by a practitioner with sufficient experience.
5.3 Collect Physical Image of Device Partition
Using the operating system that has been injected into memory, we are now able to utilize our
Forensic Copy capability to collect a physical image of the device’s flash storage. Hashes
(such as MD5 and SHA1) are utilized to verify the forensic soundness of the copy operation
and to ensure that errors are not introduced in the transmission. Stages that utilize the Foren-
sic Examination capability will use the output of the Forensic Copy capability.
5.4 Examine App Files in Private Storage
We utilized the Forensic Examination capability to examine the files stored within the
apps’ private directories. We were successful in locating a number of notable artefacts, including
personally identifiable information (PII), authentication tokens, encryption keys and cached
data. In terms of PII, we located usernames, email addresses and geolocation information, along
with any PII stored in the files cached by the apps. Authentication tokens were a particularly
interesting finding as, combined with the capabilities in the “Examine and Analyze Accounts
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Data” stage (see Section 5.7), the information can be used to collect data from remote sources.
This, however, requires the use of the Transmit and Listen capabilities, to communicate
with external systems, and the associated constraints on the operation of these capabilities
apply. Combining the encryption keys that we located with app data collected from the external
storage, we were able to use the Decrypt capability to access files which had been protected by
apps, presumably to prevent external viewing. Finally cached data presented a particularly rich
valuable source within the internal storage, in terms of potential evidence data.
5.5 Examine App Files on External Storage
Again utilizing the Forensic Examination capability, we were able to locate files stored
by the examined apps. The majority of these files were cached versions of files stored on the
respective online services by the users and were stored unprotected. However, a subset of these
files was stored using encryption, with the encryption key generally being stored within private
storage.
5.6 Examine App Databases
The Forensic Examination of app databases resulted in the location of numerous arte-
facts of PII and file related metadata. PII data included user identifiers such as usernames and
email addresses, access times, and geolocation data. The majority of data stored by the apps
related to the files accessed and cached by them. File metadata included typical entries such as
filename, paths, access, modification, deletion, synchronization and creation timestamps, and
file types. The databases also stored a range of more esoteric metadata such as sharing, owner-
ship and permissions metadata, encryption metadata, file hashes, JSON encoded data and file
URLs. Forensic practitioners can combine select data, such as file URLs, with the Listen and
Transmit capabilities to access data stored on remote systems. This may include files stored
by the user or public information stored by the service about the user (such as avatars). How-
ever, consideration must be given to the constraints on these capabilities. For example, the
forensic soundness requirement to ensure thatmeaning is preserved may be difficult to main-
tain when the precise purpose of a URL, located within an app’s database, is unknown.
5.7 Examine and Analyze Accounts Data
Examination and analysis of accounts data utilizes a number of adversary capabilities, which if
used without due consideration, may result in a breach of forensic soundness principles. For
example, to extract accounts information, which is protected by Android’s OS security,
requires the use of the Inject capability. Inject is used, in concert with Modify, to add
code to and modify the existing underlying OS frameworks, which ultimately results in the
bypassing of security checking code (usually used to validate that the app which is requesting
access to stored credentials is the same app that originally stored them). These functions would
often need to be utilized on the evidence source device. This has the obvious consequence of
potentially introducing errors and violating the associated forensic soundness requirements
dealing with data modification. To avoid this circumstance, practitioners must ensure that the
code being used is subject to transparency and trustworthiness constraints (i.e. having the code
independently verified to ensure that it does not result in unknown modification to evidential
data) and logging the operation of the code to ensure that the output is free of errors. Experi-
ence is another forensic soundness constraint that must be considered in the operation of these
capabilities. A practitioner with experience in the development and operation of the
Injected and Modified code is less likely to cause errors and ensure thatmeaning is
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maintained. After the data has been collected, the Transmit capability can be used to transfer
the data from the mobile device to a forensic workstation for further examination and use.
While host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) [24] and other similar heuristic tech-
nologies are not yet prevalent on mobile devices, it is reasonable to assume that they may be
introduced in the future as device performance improves [25]. With this in mind, the inclusion
of a HIDS in a mobile device OS may increase the difficulty for a forensic practitioner when
attempting modifications, such as this one, on the mobile device. This highlights the impor-
tance of live booting a forensic OS, which would bypass any HIDS implemented on the native
OS. It should be possible to modify the OS frameworks on a forensic OS to allow for the extrac-
tion of credentials; however, this would significantly increase the level of per device customisa-
tion required for the forensic OS.
Examination of accounts data, in our case, returned a range of data including refresh tokens,
access tokens, usernames, passwords, emails and timestamps. Refresh tokens are requested
from the app servers using the users credentials and stored by apps to request updated access
tokens which are, in turn, used to access protected resources (e.g. user files and records stored
on remote systems).
5.8 Analyze App
After all available evidential data has been extracted from private and external storage, data-
bases and OS accounts storage, a forensic practitioner may choose to conduct further analysis
on the apps themselves. This analysis may be necessary to meet themeaning forensic sound-
ness requirement as, although data may have been extracted, its precise meaning is not neces-
sarily known. For example, timestamps may be recorded for “access” to an app or file, however
it may not always be clear how “access” is defined by the app developers. Detailed analysis of
the app would answer this question. This analysis was achieved in our case using both the
decompilation of the app source code (static analysis) and analysis of the memory and opera-
tion of the app while it is running on a physical or emulated device (dynamic analysis). Using
these techniques, we were able to locate various items of interest such as URLs for authentica-
tion, app secrets and protected information, which would otherwise be obfuscated during nor-
mal app operation.
5.9 Comparative Summary
Table 3 presents a comparison of this Android evidence collection and analysis methodology
with similar methodologies in the literature.
As the work by and Chen, Yang and Liu [15] require the Android device to have an external
SD card slot, they are unable to perform bit-for-bit physical copies of devices that do not allow
for external SD cards. Furthermore, there may already be data on the obtained device’s SD
card. Their work cannot be applied to devices that do not have an SD card slot. Our methodol-
ogy is applicable to devices with and without SD card slots and is able to perform bit-for-bit
copies of both kinds of devices.
Conclusion
Mobile devices and apps are an increasingly ubiquitous tool used throughout the daily lives of
people worldwide. However these devices and apps can present a genuine security and privacy
threat to mobile device and app users, due to their capacity to access sensitive data and person-
ally identifiable information. In addition, as the use of mobile devices and apps grows, so too
does their use by criminals, particularly in areas of sophisticated and organized crime where
ongoing secure communications is critical for the operation of a criminal syndicate.
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In this paper, we proposed a forensic adversary model which, to the best of our knowledge,
is the first adversary model to be used in a forensic context. By utilizing the McKemmish [20]
model for forensic soundness as a base in terms of selecting capabilities, the adversary model
formalizes the real world capabilities of a forensic practitioner in obtaining evidential data
from mobile devices. A key difference between our forensic adversary model and the adversary
model(s) used in security and cryptography research is the constraint of forensic soundness
(see Table 3).
We demonstrated how this adversary model can be used to derive an Android evidence col-
lection and analysis methodology. This methodology facilitates the presentation of valid evi-
dence. Using the methodology, we analyzed a number of cloud-based apps for potential
evidential data. We then summarized the relationship between our findings, including the key
forensic artefacts that we were able to locate, and the adversary’s capabilities and forensic
soundness constraints. We also found that it was possible to obtain a significant amount of evi-
dential data using our methodology whilst also maintaining the required level of forensic
soundness (outlined in Definition 1).
Future work includes deploying the forensic adversary model in a range of forensic case
studies and investigations.
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